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1. Introduction
Research on multinational rms has recently been extended to incorporate elements
of contract theory. This literature addresses rmsdecisions to source components in-
house versus at arms length and their choices over whether to locate production at home
or abroad. It di¤ers from earlier work on multinationals in its emphasis on the costs
associated with writing contracts for specialized inputs and on the importance of traded
intermediate goods.
This paper provides an empirical examination of the determinants of intra-rm trade.
We use detailed U.S. import data to characterize the product and country attributes that
determine rmsdecisions to import from related parties rather than at arms length.
Theoretical models addressing this issue focus on the ability of the rm to write contracts
for the production of specialized inputs. We introduce a new measure of productsrevealed
contractibility based on the idea that contracting is easier for products that are traded
by intermediaries such as wholesalers.
Forty-six percent of U.S. imports occur between related parties in 2000. This aggregate
statistic, however, obscures considerable variation in intra-rm intensity across import
partners as well as products. Indeed, while 74 percent of U.S. imports from Japan are
intra-rm, the gure for Bangladesh is just 2 percent. Likewise, trade between related
parties accounts for 2 percent of U.S. imports of rubber and plastic footwear, but more
than 70 percent of U.S. imports of autos, medical equipment and instruments. There is
also signicant variation in intra-rm intensity across countries within products.
These gures highlight the importance of product and country characteristics and
especially their interaction in explaining intra-rm trade. Such factors are emphasized
in recent theoretical models of multinational rms that stress the role of contracting
in rms decisions both to source components in-house versus at arms length and to
locate production at home versus abroad.1 These models di¤er from earlier theories
of multinationals in their emphasis on the costs associated with writing contracts for
specialized inputs and the attention they pay to traded intermediate goods. Guided by
these models, we examine the product and country determinants of intra-rm trade.
Our ndings are related to the large theoretical literature on international trade and
the boundaries of the rm, including in particular Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman
(2004), and Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005). Our ndings are also related to the
recent empirical literature examining the predictions of these models, including Corcos
1See, for example, Pol Antràs (2003), Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman (2004), and Gene M. Grossman
and Elhanan Helpman (2005).
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et al. (2008), Defever and Toubal (2007), Nunn and Treer (2008) and Yeaple (2006).
More generally, our ndings are related to the recent literature on institutions and trade,
including Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007).
We nd that our measure of contractibility and countriesgovernance quality are asso-
ciated with variation in intra-rm trade in interesting and intuitive ways, and that factors
associated with engaging in related-party trade di¤er from those associated with the in-
tensity of intra-rm trade once a link is established. Higher-quality country governance,
for example, is associated with a higher probability of related-party trade taking place.
Further increases in quality, however, coincide with lower shares of related-party trade,
presumably due to the greater ease with which arms-length contracts can be written.
With respect to interactions of product and country attributes, improvements in coun-
try governance lead to the largest reductions in intra-rm trade in low contractibility
products.
2. Data
We use the U.S. Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD),
which links individual U.S. trade transactions to U.S. rms.2 For each import transaction,
we observe the U.S. rm engaging in the transaction, the ten-digit Harmonized System
(HS) classication of the product shipped, the (nominal) value shipped, the shipment
date, the source country, and whether the transaction takes place at arms length(AL)
or between related parties (RP). Import partners are related if either party owns,
directly or indirectly, 6 percent or more of the other party.3 To concord SIC production
and HS trade data, and to expand the sample of countries on which data on country
characteristics are available, we focus on the year 1997.
To explore the role of various country characteristics discussed below, we combine
these trade data with measures of physical capital abundance, human capital abundance,
and population from Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones (1999), a composite index
of countriesgovernance quality from the World Bank, and measures of trade and FDI
protection from Heritage Foundation/WSJ (2006). We use factor analysis to create
a univariate measure of country governance for 1996 from the six World Bank measures
reported by Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). The rst factor
accounts for around 90 percent of the variance of each of the six component measures and
2See Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen and Peter K. Schott (2009) for more details.
3This dataset excludes the U.S. Postal Service and rms in agriculture, forestry and shing, railroads,
education, public administration and several smaller sectors.
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we use this factor as the indicator of governance in our empirical work.
We measure productscapital and skill intensity using data from the 1997 U.S. Cen-
sus of Manufactures. We assign all ten-digit HS products within a particular four-digit
SIC industry the average physical capital or skill intensity of all plants whose output is
concentrated in that industry. Physical capital intensity is measured as the log of the
book value of plant and equipment per employee while skill is non-production workers
as a share of employment. Industry headquarters intensity is measured by the average
share of rm employment at headquarters and auxiliary establishments.
3. Intra-rm imports
This section documents the extent of U.S. intra-rm imports by trading partner and
industry. To maximize our ability to report results across countries and industries, we
use recently published, publicly available data on related-party trade from the Foreign
Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau.4 The industry data on related-party trade
is reported according to the North American Industry Classication System (NAICS)
and, as a result, di¤ers from the more detailed Harmonized System codes available in the
LFFTD and employed in the subsequent regression analysis.
3.1. By Country
We begin by considering variation in related-party imports across countries in 2000.
The data are summarized in Table 1 which reports the level of imports and the share of
related-party imports by country. Over 46 percent of U.S. imports are intra-rm and there
is wide range in intensity of intra-rm trade across countries. For the average country,
23.8 percent of exports to the U.S. are intra-rm and more than a quarter of countries
have intra-rm shares less than 5 percent. On the low end, imports from Bangladesh are
almost entirely arms-length transactions, with just 2 percent of the total value of imports
taking place inside the rm. In contrast, imports from Japan and Ireland are dominated
by intra-rm transactions. In 2000, 76 percent of the value of imports from Ireland
and 74 percent of the imports from Japan were conducted by multinationals trading
with related foreign divisions. Anecdotal publicly-available evidence would suggest that
the intra-rm imports of Ireland and Japan stem from di¤erent types of organizations.
Japanese intra-rm shipments to the U.S. are likely trades between Japanese parents and
4We choose 2000 as it is the year closest to the product-country import data used in our
empirical specications below. The original data source for all the results in this section is
http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty.
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U.S. subsidiaries, while Irish intra-rm shipments are more likely to be between Irish
subsidiaries and U.S. parents, or U.S. a¢ liates of European multinationals.
In general, countries that account for low shares of U.S. intra-rm imports are less
developed and have lower overall import volumes, while high-income countries in the
OECD generally report above average intra-rm imports to the United States. Imports
from China, the fourth largest source of U.S. imports in 2000, are still largely conducted
between unrelated parties with just 18 percent exchanged inside the rm.
3.2. By Industry
As with the country-level data, industries vary widely in the extent to which their
trade takes place within rms.5 Imports of leather, textiles and apparel are dominated by
arms-length transactions while more than half of imports in transportation equipment,
computers and electronics products and chemicals are conducted between related parties.
Table 2 reports the manufacturing industries with the 20 highest and 20 lowest shares
of related-party trade in 2000 using 6-digit NAICS industries. Footwear industries are
heavily represented in the low end of the distribution of intra-rm trade shares. In rubber
and plastic footwear, for example, intra-rm imports account for just 1.8 percent of total
imports. Imports of autos and related equipment, medical equipment and pharmaceuti-
cals, and instruments, on the other hand, are dominated by intra-rm transactions. In
each of these industries, more than 70 percent of all imports are between related parties.
These industry averages obscure important variation across countries within products.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of imports of Photo Films, Plates and Chemicals (NAICS
325992) across countries. This industry has fth highest share of intra-rm imports.
The gure shows both the share of intra-rm imports from each country (line - left axis)
and the level of overall imports (bar - log scale right axis). The countries are sorted by
the share of intra-rm imports in total imports in 2000. While the industry as a whole
has a high level of intra-rm trade, there is substantial variation across countries. Half
the countries, including most of the major exporters by volume, have intra-rm shares
greater than 70 percent. Most of the remaining countries, including a number of middle
income and developing countries, have little or no related-party trade to the U.S..
This pattern of heterogeneous intra-rm shares across countries within industries is
the norm rather than the exception. Figure 2 shows the same picture for imports of Other
5In this section we use publicly available data from the foreign trade division of the Census Bureau.
As a consequence these table use the NAICS industry classication system. In our regression results
below we use the much more disaggregated 10-digit products of the Harmonized System.
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Footwear (NAICS 316219).6 This industry has sixth lowest share of intra-rm imports
but again there is a wide variation in related party shares ranging from 100 percent
to zero. This variation in intra-rm imports shares within industries across countries
motivates our use of both country and product characteristics and their interaction in our
subsequent empirical work.
4. "Revealed Contractibility"
We assume that products passing through intermediaries are the easiest over which
to contract. As a result, we measure productsrevealedcontractibility as the weighted
average wholesale employment share of rms importing the product, using rmsimport
value as weights,
IMEDp =
X
f
Wf
EMPf
Mpf
Mp
: (1)
The rst term in the intermediation measure is the share of wholesale employment (Wf)
in rm fs total employment (EMPf).7 The second term is the import share of rm
f in ten-digit HS product market p, with Mpf and Mp representing rm fs imports
of product p and total U.S. imports of product p, respectively. Intermediation ranges
between zero and unity: if no rms importing product p have any wholesale establishments,
IMEDp = 0. On the other hand, if product p is imported exclusively by rms with 100
percent employment in wholesaling, IMEDp = 1.
Table 3 reports the intermediation measure for HS2 industries in 1997. Industries are
sorted according to intermediation, from low to high. Across industries, intermediation
averages 0.241, ranging from 0.012 in non-railway vehicles (HS 87) to 0.631 in lead (HS
78), with an interquartile range of 0.123 to 0.345. Agricultural goods and relatively labor
intensive industries such as apparel and footwear generally have the highest measured
intermediation, while more sophisticated products such as vehicles, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals and photographic goods have the lowest measures of intermediation.
Intermediation and intra-rm import shares are inversely related across two-digit HS
categories, as shown in Figure 1. There is however substantial independent variation in
the two variables, as industries with similar levels of intermediation span a wide range of
intra-rm intensity. Footwear (HS 64) and Organic Chemicals (HS 29), for example, have
6Only countries with more than $100,000 of of U.S. imports are shown.
7We observe employment at the establishment level and therefore assign all employees in an establish-
ment to the major industry of the establishment. Firms with a single establishment necessarily have 100
percent employment in a single industry. Wholesale is NAICS sector 42.
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comparable levels of intermediation, 0.135 and 0.136 respectively. However, more than
half of Organic Chemicals imports are conducted by related parties while the intra-rm
trade share for Footwear is less than 10 percent.
5. Determinants of intra-rm trade
Our empirical analysis uses cross-sectional data on intra-rm and total U.S. imports
of product p from county c in 1997. Our empirical specication regresses measures of
intra-rm trade (IFpc) on product characteristics (Xp), country characteristics (Zc) and
interactions between product and country characteristics (Xp  Zc):
IFpc =  + Xp + Zc +  (XpZc) + pc; (2)
We consider two measures of intra-rm trade: the share of intra-rm imports in U.S.
imports, which we refer to as the intensivemargin, and a dummy variable which is equal
to one if there are positive intra-rm imports for a product from a country, which we call
the extensivemargin. In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample
mean from each variable entering the interaction term. This normalization ensures that
the main e¤ects of each variable can be interpreted as the e¤ect at the sample mean.
Our choice of product and country characteristics is motivated by the recent theoreti-
cal literature on contractual frictions and international trade. This literature emphasizes
the relative importance of relationship-specic investments by headquarters and supplier
rms and the degree of veriability of these investments. In Antràs (2003), capital inten-
sity captures the relative importance of headquartersinvestments, and hence we include
industry capital intensity and country capital abundance. To allow for the possibility that
other factor intensities matter, we also include industry skill intensity and country skill
abundance. In Antràs and Helpman (2004), headquarters investments are interpreted
more broadly, and hence we include the direct measure of headquarters intensity noted
above. In Grossman and Helpman (2005), the degree of veriability of relationship-specic
investments can vary with product and country characteristics, and hence we include re-
vealed product contractibility and country governance as further independent variables.
Finally, we explore the impact of policy-based barriers by including measures of trade and
FDI protection as country characteristics.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating specication (2). Columns (1) and (3) use the
extensive margin as the dependent variable, so the sample comprises all product-country
cells with positive imports, including those with zero intra-rm trade. Columns (2) and
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(4) focus on the intensive margin, and the sample is all observations with positive intra-
rm trade. Columns (3) and (4) control for the non-random selection of observations
with positive intra-rm imports using the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure. The
two stages are separately identied by functional form and the excluded variable from
the second-stage regression. For the excluded variable, we choose the cost of phone calls
to the US, which arguably a¤ects the xed costs of establishing an a¢ liate but not the
relative variable costs of intra-rm versus arms-length trade.8
We nd an important role for revealed contractibility on both the intensive and ex-
tensive margins of intra-rm trade. Consistent with the recent theoretical literature
on contractual frictions in international trade, columns (1) and (2) show that higher re-
vealed product contractibility is associated with less intra-rm trade. The role of the
contracting environment varies across the intensive and extensive margins. Increases
in governance quality raise the probability that foreign a¢ liates are present (column 1),
but are associated with lower shares of intra-rm trade (column 2). This result suggests
good governance promotes the establishment of related-party trade but not its intensity
once established, which is consistent with the idea that arms-length contracting is easier
in countries with good governance. This non-linearity in the role of the country con-
tracting environment is not formally developed in existing theoretical models. Similar
di¤erences between the intensive and extensive margins are present for population and
FDI protection.
Results in Table 4 also indicate the signicance of interactions of product and country
characteristics in determining intra-rm trade. While the main e¤ects for intermediation
and country governance are both negative in column (4), the interaction term has a
positive coe¢ cient. That is, improved governance is associated with less intra-rm trade,
especially for goods with lower revealed contractibility.
In contrast to previous work, we also nd a role for industry skill intensity and coun-
try skill abundance. The main e¤ects of industry skill intensity on intra-rm trade are
positive for both the intensive and extensive margins; the main e¤ects of country human
capital abundance are negative; and the estimated coe¢ cients on the skill interaction
terms are negative. Therefore, greater industry skill intensity increases the share of intra-
rm trade, and leads to larger increases in more skill-scarce countries. In contrast, greater
country skill abundance reduces the share of intra-rm trade, and leads to larger reduc-
tions in more skill-intensive products. As in Antràs (2003), industry capital intensity
8The likelihood ratio test of rho=0 yields a chi-squared statistic of 26.21, rejecting the null of inde-
pendent equations.
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and country capital abundance play a role in determining the share of intra-rm trade.
The positive coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry capital intensity and country
capital abundance implies that intra-rm trade shares are high for capital-intensive prod-
ucts coming from capital-abundant countries. Both FDI and trade protection inuence
intra-rm trade; headquarters intensity is not statistically signicantly associated with
intra-rm trade shares.
In Table 5, we repeat the OLS specication from column (2) in Table 4 with a complete
set of country and product xed e¤ects to examine the robustness of the results on the
interaction terms. The contractibility-governance and human capital interactions retain
their sign and signicance while the interaction on physical capital is insignicant.
5.1. Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of the results to alternative specications.
Column 1 of Table 6 repeats the preferred specication from column 4 in Table 4. In
columns 2-4, we drop sectors that contain rms that do not conform strictly to the ex-
isting theoretical models. The literature on multinationals and contracting envisions a
producing rm headquartered in an advanced country importing intermediate goods, po-
tentially from its a¢ liates. Our results in column 1 include all imports, including imports
of nal goods and imports by U.S. a¢ liates of foreign multinationals. Column 2 excludes
sectors that are intensive in foreign-owned rms, column 3 drops nal goods products and
column 4 drops both at once.9 None of the coe¢ cients change sign or signicance and
all the main conclusions are robust to these sample changes.
In the nal three columns of Table 6, we include additional regressors considered in
related empirical work. Column 5 adds a measure of industry R&D intensity, the R&D
to sales ratio which is only available for a subset of industries.10 The R&D coe¢ cient
is positive and signicant, conrming results in Antràs (2003), Yeaple (2006) and others.
Adding industry R&D intensity eliminates the signicance of the physical capital inter-
action as well as that of human capital intensity. Finally in columns 6 and 7, we add
the measure of contractibility suggested by Nunn (2007) based on the proportion of each
9To identify sectors that are intensive in foreign a¢ liate imports, we use the Bureau of Economic
Analysis measure of US imports shipped to a¢ liates by the foreign parent group by sector. We con-
struct a measure foreign input intensity by dividing the imports shipped to a¢ liates by employment
in an industry. High foreign a¢ liate industries are those above the mean. Data is available at
http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/international/iidguide.htm#FDIUS. We follow the classica-
tion of Sitchinava (2007) to identify product categories that are nal good imports. All columns of Table
6 report the second stage of a Heckman specication with the cost of phone calls as the excluded variable
in the second stage.
10R&D are available from the NSF at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris/history_pub.cfm.
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industrys intermediate inputs that are relationship-specic and therefore susceptible to
potential contracting problems.11 Column 7 includes an interaction of the Nunn measure
with the country governance measure. The Nunn measure is positive and signicant, as
found by Nunn and Treer (2008), but does not a¤ect the revealed contractibility mea-
sure or its interaction. The interaction term is negative and signicant, which combined
with the negative main e¤ect of country governance implies that improvements in country
governance are associated with the largest reductions in intra-rm trade in sectors with
more relationship-specic inputs. These results suggest that the Nunn measure of input
sophistication and our measure of intermediation may be capturing di¤erent aspects of
product contractibility both of which interact with country governance in shaping whether
trade occurs within the boundary of the rm.
6. Conclusions
The literature on rms and international trade has focused attention on issues of con-
tracting and the boundaries of the rm. This research speaks to policy issues surrounding
the growth of outsourcing, o¤shoring and international production networks.
Our results provide evidence on the role of country governance and product con-
tractibility in determining intra-rm trade. We nd evidence of selection: the decision
to establish a foreign a¢ liate in a country di¤ers from the choice of how much to source
from the a¢ liate once it is established. While a¢ liates are more likely to be situated in
countries that are larger and have better governance, once a¢ liates exist, the share of
intra-rm trade is negatively related to both country size and country governance quality.
Our ndings both complement and extend the existing empirical literature on intra-
rm trade. Our results conrm the role of industry capital intensity and country capital
abundance in inuencing intra-rm trade. Our results also point to the role of other
interactions between country and product characteristics and their interactions.
11According to Nunn (2007), relationship specic inputs are those that are not traded on organized
exchanges as measured by Rauch (1999).
Intra-Firm Trade and Product Contractibility 11
Antràs, Pol. 2003. Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118, 1375-1418.
Antràs, Pol and Elhanan Helpman. 2004. Global Sourcing. Journal of Political
Economy 112, 552-580.
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen and Peter K. Schott. 2009. Importers,
Exporters and Multinationals: A Portrait of Firms in the U.S. that Trade Goods, in
Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from Micro Data, ed. Timothy Dunne, J. Bradford
Jensen and Mark J. Roberts, 133-63. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Corcos, Gregory, Delphine Irac, Giordano Mion and Thierry Verdier. 2008.
The Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade,London School of Economics, mimeograph.
Defever, Fabrice and Farid Toubal. 2007. Productivity and the Sourcing Modes of
Multinational Firms: Evidence from French Firm-Level Data,CEP Discussion Paper,
0842, London School of Economics.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 2003. Outsourcing versus FDI in
Industry Equilibrium. Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (Papers and
Proceedings), 317-327.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 2005. Outsourcing in a Global Econ-
omy. Review of Economic Studies 72, 135-159.
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce
So Much More Output per Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114,
83-116.
Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal. 2006. Index of Economic Freedom.
Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC.
Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2006. Governance Mat-
ters V. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Levchenko, Andrei 2007. Institutional Quality and International Trade. Review of
Economic Studies, 74(3), 791-819.
Nunn, Nathan. 2007. Relationship-Specicity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern
of Trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics,122:2, May, 569-600
Nunn, Nathan, and Daniel Treer. 2008. The Boundaries of the Multinational Firm:
An Empirical Analysis. in E. Helpman, D. Marin, and T. Verdier (eds.), The Organization
of Firms in a Global Economy, Harvard University Press, 2008
Rauch, James. 1999. Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of
International Economics, 48, pp. 735.
Sitchinava, Nino. 2007. Market Structure Index of HTS Imports, University of Oregon
Intra-Firm Trade and Product Contractibility 12
mimeo.
Yeaple, Stephen R. 2006. O¤shoring, Foreign Direct Investment, and the Structure
of U.S. Trade, Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings,
April-May, Vol. 4 Issue 2-3, 602-611
Intra-Firm Trade and Product Contractibility 13
Country/Terrority
 Total Imports
(millions)
Related-Party
Import Share Country/Terrority
 Total Imports
(millions)
Related-Party
Import Share Country/Terrority
 Total Imports
(millions)
Related-Party
Import Share
Brunei 387 0.000 United Arab Emirates 937 0.073 Bosnia-Hercegovina 18 0.296
Lesotho 140 0.000 India 10,680 0.077 Kuwait 2,499 0.307
Equatorial Guinea 155 0.000 Nicaragua 597 0.078 Italy 24,790 0.312
Palau 14 0.001 Qatar 491 0.078 Portugal 1,571 0.321
Turkmenistan 28 0.001 Bulgaria 231 0.081 Bolivia 184 0.327
Micronesia 14 0.002 Guyana 127 0.083 Czech Republic 1,069 0.334
Republic of Yemen 151 0.002 Belarus 104 0.086 Thailand 16,300 0.340
Mozambique 24 0.003 Cyprus 23 0.086 St Lucia 22 0.342
Botswana 41 0.003 Ecuador 2,267 0.089 Norway 5,540 0.353
Swaziland 53 0.005 Turkey 3,027 0.095 Nigeria 9,680 0.364
Oman 257 0.006 Kenya 109 0.097 Maldives 94 0.368
Uzbekistan 35 0.007 Panama 297 0.105 Iraq 4,393 0.372
Mauritius 286 0.008 Ghana 206 0.114 New Zealand 2,055 0.379
Algeria 2,690 0.008 Guatemala 2,603 0.122 Morocco 456 0.380
Cambodia 824 0.009 Lithuania 132 0.123 Gabon 2,038 0.403
Faroe Islands 31 0.011 Netherlands Antilles 721 0.126 France 29,430 0.410
Madagascar 158 0.011 Ivory Coast 367 0.136 Belgium 9,844 0.415
Namibia 42 0.015 Sri Lanka 2,002 0.137 Iceland 260 0.416
Bermuda 39 0.015 Hong Kong 11,350 0.140 Slovakia 242 0.421
Bangladesh 2,416 0.019 Tanzania 35 0.142 Bahamas 273 0.434
Ethiopia 29 0.023 Congo (Kinshasa) 212 0.145 Canada 229,100 0.440
Burma (Myanmar) 468 0.024 Barbados 38 0.145 Denmark 2,953 0.451
Macedonia (Skopje) 138 0.025 South Africa 4,204 0.151 El Salvador 1,925 0.456
Cameroon 146 0.027 Venezuela 17,430 0.151 Dominican Republic 4,378 0.459
Uganda 29 0.031 Greece 602 0.157 Jamaica 632 0.475
Peru 1,985 0.032 Georgia 24 0.160 United Kingdom 42,840 0.488
British Virgin Islands 31 0.032 Argentina 3,095 0.163 St Kitts and Nevis 37 0.493
Nepal 229 0.032 Bahrain 338 0.164 Philippines 13,940 0.496
Uruguay 309 0.033 Ukraine 872 0.166 Austria 3,118 0.506
Pakistan 2,164 0.035 Zambia 18 0.173 Honduras 3,091 0.519
Haiti 297 0.035 Chile 3,258 0.179 Suriname 135 0.523
Macao 1,265 0.036 China 99,580 0.181 Switzerland 10,090 0.536
Fiji 146 0.036 Malawi 68 0.189 Netherlands 9,679 0.536
Angola 3,343 0.036 Tunisia 91 0.200 Saudi Arabia 14,330 0.549
Estonia 542 0.038 Romania 471 0.215 Korea, South 39,830 0.554
Mongolia 117 0.039 Taiwan 40,380 0.216 Luxembourg 331 0.575
Iran 169 0.043 Croatia 141 0.218 Finland 3,238 0.617
Paraguay 42 0.045 Indonesia 10,320 0.228 Malaysia 25,450 0.645
Papua New Guinea 37 0.046 Colombia 6,681 0.228 Germany 58,350 0.647
Jordan 73 0.046 Aruba 1,222 0.229 Mexico 134,700 0.661
Azerbaijan 20 0.046 French Polynesia 44 0.231 Malta 462 0.675
Lebanon 76 0.050 Spain 5,674 0.241 Costa Rica 3,555 0.692
Vietnam 827 0.053 Slovenia 314 0.242 Hungary 2,711 0.694
Moldova 105 0.060 Israel 12,950 0.248 Sweden 9,570 0.700
Armenia 23 0.063 Kazakhstan 432 0.253 Singapore 19,110 0.727
Zimbabwe 113 0.065 Trinidad and Tobago 2,179 0.253 Japan 145,700 0.743
Greenland 16 0.066 Russia 7,761 0.266 Ireland 16,370 0.761
Grenada 27 0.066 Congo (Brazzaville) 508 0.272 Guinea 88 0.882
Syria 150 0.068 Poland 1,040 0.275 Liechtenstein 293 0.886
Latvia 295 0.068 Monaco 23 0.275 Liberia 45 0.888
Egypt 925 0.070 Australia 6,213 0.290 New Caledonia 31 0.972
Belize 91 0.073 Brazil 13,730 0.293
Table 1: U.S. Imports and Related-Party Share By Country, 2000
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20 Lowest Related-party Import Shares (NAICS 6-digit)
 Total
Imports
(millions$)
 Related-
Party
Imports
(millions$)
Related-
Party Import
Share
Motor Homes 119 1 0.004
Rubber & Plastic Footwear 584 10 0.018
Primary Smelting & Refining of Copper 2,396 66 0.027
Missile/Space Veh Parts & Auziliary Equip, NESOI 224 7 0.033
Cut Stone & Stone Products 1,281 44 0.034
Other Footwear 4,164 151 0.036
Folding Paperboard Boxes 385 16 0.041
Jewelers'  Material & Lapidary Work 13,228 582 0.044
Canvas & Related Products 234 11 0.048
Prefabricated Wood Buildings 104 6 0.053
Dried and Dehydrated Foods 161 9 0.056
Spices & Extracts 501 29 0.058
Women's Footwear (Exc Athletic) 6,012 349 0.058
Women's/Girl's Dresses 2,104 126 0.060
Fur & Leather Apparel 1,973 121 0.061
Men's Footwear (Exc Athletic) 3,590 230 0.064
Hats & Caps 923 63 0.068
Wines 2,706 204 0.075
Softwood Veneer & Plywood 271 21 0.077
Miscellaneous Wood Products 1,765 140 0.079
20 Highest Related-Party Import Shares (NAICS 6-digit)
Prepared Flour Mixes & Dough 123 89 0.722
Electromedical Apparatus 3,129 2,262 0.723
Automatic Environmental Controls 619 450 0.727
Motor Vehicle Gasoline engines  & Engine Parts 10,262 7,504 0.731
Sanitary Paper Products 736 538 0.731
Telephone Apparatus 13,041 9,552 0.732
Motor Vehicle Electrical & Electronic Equip, Nesoi 7,337 5,374 0.732
Medicinal & Botonical Drugs & Vitamins 17,400 12,823 0.737
Carbon Paper & Inked Ribbon 314 233 0.741
Pharmaceutical Preparations 10,131 7,591 0.749
Motor Vehicle  Air-Conditioning 1,225 919 0.750
Bottled Water 200 151 0.755
Tires & Tire Parts (Excl Retreadings) 4,720 3,587 0.760
Computer Storage Devices 16,283 12,683 0.779
Pesticides & Other Agricultural Chemicals 500 401 0.802
Photo Films, Papers, Plates & Chemicals 2,485 2,026 0.815
Table 2: U.S. Related Party Trade by 6-Digiti NAICS Industry, 2000
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Chapter Description Intermediation Chapter Description Intermediation
87 Non-Railway vehicles 0.012 51 Wool, woven fabric 0.223
27 Mineral fuels, oils, waxes 0.019 62 Apparel, not knitted or crocheted 0.232
1 Live animals 0.023 33 Oils; perfumery 0.234
88 Aircraft, spacecraft 0.024 22 Beverages, spirits 0.241
86 Railway locomotives 0.025 79 Zinc and articles thereof 0.242
30 Pharmaceutical products 0.027 69 Ceramic products 0.247
26 Ores, slag and ash 0.030 36 Explosives 0.247
89 Ships, boats, etc. 0.034 96 Misc. manufactured articles 0.259
37 Photographic goods 0.043 21 Misc. edible preparations 0.262
75 Nickel and articles thereof 0.050 80 Tin and articles thereof 0.274
31 Fertilisers 0.056 54 Man-made filaments 0.282
97 Works of art, antiques 0.068 63 Other made up textile articles 0.291
85 Electrical machinery 0.084 56 Wadding, yarns, ropes, cables 0.293
47 Pulp of wood 0.088 68 Stone, plaster, cement 0.295
38 Misc. chemical products 0.090 15 Animal, vegetable fats and oils 0.297
28 Inorganic chemicals+Z77 0.094 11 Milling industry products 0.301
90 Instruments 0.095 42 Leather; saddlery and harness 0.314
76 Aluminum and articles thereof 0.100 91 Clocks and watches 0.322
48 Paper; articles of paper pulp 0.101 50 Silk 0.327
84 Nuclear reactors, machinery 0.102 92 Musical instruments 0.327
25 Salt; earths and stone 0.106 66 Umbrella, walking-sticks 0.334
24 Tobacco 0.108 16 Preparations of meat, fish 0.339
40 Rubber and articles thereof 0.118 2 Meat 0.341
49 Printed books, newspapers 0.122 8 Fruit and nuts 0.345
17 Sugars 0.123 41 Raw hides, skins, leather 0.345
23 Residues from food industries 0.130 58 Woven fabrics; tapestries 0.369
71 Pearls, precious metals, coin 0.135 93 Arms and ammunition 0.373
29 Organic chemicals 0.135 55 Man-made staple fibres 0.373
64 Footwear, gaiters 0.136 13 Gums, resins 0.374
70 Glass and glassware 0.141 46 Straw; basketware 0.379
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 0.162 57 Carpets, floor coverings 0.384
35 Starches, glues, enzymes 0.168 45 Cork articles 0.409
10 Cereals 0.172 14 Vegetable products 0.414
81 Other base metals 0.173 65 Headgear and parts thereof 0.415
18 Cocoa 0.175 5 Animal products 0.433
94 Furniture; prefab buildings 0.179 4 Dairy produce; honey 0.433
12 Oil seeds, grains, plants 0.181 67 Feathers and down articles 0.440
74 Copper and articles thereof 0.186 20 Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.447
39 Plastics and articles thereof 0.192 43 Furskins and artificial fur 0.454
72 Iron and steel 0.193 7 Vegetables 0.460
34 Soap, waxes, candles 0.195 60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 0.465
83 Misc. articles of base metal 0.196 3 Fish, crustaceans 0.469
95 Toys, games 0.199 9 Coffee, tea, spices 0.474
61 Knitted or crocheted apparel 0.207 19 Cereals, flour, milk 0.482
59 Textile fabrics 0.211 53 Vegetable textile fibres 0.500
82 Tools, implements, cutlery 0.212 6 Trees and plants 0.516
44 Wood articles; wood charcoal 0.213 52 Cotton 0.529
73 Articles of iron or steel 0.214 78 Lead and articles thereof 0.631
Table 3: Intermediation Index by HS2 Industry, 1997
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Intermediation -0.715 *** -0.165 *** -0.719 *** -0.235 ***
(0.050) (0.019) (0.050) (0.025)
Governance 0.154 *** -0.031 *** 0.103 *** -0.031 ***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009)
   x Intermediation -0.058 0.084 *** -0.056 0.090 ***
(0.039) (0.015) (0.039) (0.017)
Capital Intensity -0.005 0.059 *** -0.005 0.056 ***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Log capital abundance 0.213 *** 0.067 *** 0.173 *** 0.068 ***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007)
   x Capital intensity 0.068 *** 0.005 0.072 *** 0.010 **
(0.016) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005)
Skill Intensity 1.336 *** 0.196 *** 1.348 *** 0.324 ***
(0.192) (0.051) (0.192) (0.067)
Log human capital abundance -0.105 ** -0.066 *** -0.044 -0.059 **
(0.044) (0.022) (0.046) (0.023)
   x Skill intensity -0.415 -1.063 *** -0.460 -1.142 ***
(0.407) (0.152) (0.411) (0.174)
HQ Intensity -0.103 0.043 -0.099 0.016
(0.196) (0.065) (0.196) (0.071)
Log population 0.152 *** -0.034 *** 0.145 *** -0.033 ***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
FDI protection 0.13 *** -0.017 *** 0.154 *** 0.039 ***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
Trade protection -0.098 *** 0.017 *** -0.092 *** -0.023 ***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005)
US Phone Call Cost - - -0.050 *** -
(0.003)
Lambda - - - 0.150 ***
(0.029)
Sample
Estimation
R-squared
Observations
Note: In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from
each variable entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each
variable can be interpreted as the effect at the sample mean. Columns 1 and 3
include all country-product pairs with positive imports. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient
estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
respectively.
0.079
180,774 92,656 180,774 92,656
Full Positive Intra-firm Trade Full
Positive Intra-
firm Trade
Probit OLS Heckman
First-Stage
Heckman
Second-
Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intra-Firm
Trade
Dummy
Share of Intra-
Firm Trade
Intra-Firm
Trade
Dummy
Share of Intra-
Firm Trade
Table 4: Determinants of Intra-Firm Imports, HS10-Country 1997
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intermediation -0.165 *** -0.156 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Governance -0.031 *** -0.033 ***
(0.007) (0.008)
   x Intermediation 0.084 *** 0.074 *** 0.097 *** 0.086 ***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Capital Intensity 0.059 *** 0.055 ***
(0.007) (0.007)
Log capital abundance 0.067 *** 0.052 ***
(0.006) (0.006)
   x Capital intensity 0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Skill Intensity 0.196 *** 0.192 ***
(0.051) (0.051)
Log human capital abundance -0.066 *** -0.055 ***
(0.022) (0.021)
   x Skill intensity -1.063 *** -1.297 *** -1.175 *** -1.45 ***
(0.152) (0.181) (0.155) (0.192)
HQ Intensity 0.043 0.068
(0.065) (0.061)
Log population -0.034 *** -0.045 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
FDI protection -0.017 *** -0.017 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
Trade protection 0.017 *** 0.021 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Estimation
Sample
Fixed Effects None
Observations 92656 92656 92656
R-squared 0.154 0.300 0.368
Positive Intra-
firm Trade
OLS OLS OLS OLS
0.079
92,656
Note: Column (1) repeats the results from column (2) in Table 5.  In constructing the
interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable entering the
interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as the effect
at the sample mean. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC
level are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Country Product
Country and
Product
Positive Intra-
firm Trade
Positive Intra-
firm Trade
Positive Intra-
firm Trade
Table 5: Determinants of Intra-Firm Imports - Fixed E¤ects, HS10-Country 1997
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intermediation -0.235 *** -0.214 *** -0.235 *** -0.208 *** -0.243 *** -0.212 *** -0.206 ***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
Governance -0.031 *** -0.023 *** -0.048 *** -0.043 *** -0.059 *** -0.031 *** -0.029 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
   x Intermediation 0.09 *** 0.069 *** 0.107 *** 0.094 *** 0.107 *** 0.089 *** 0.066 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Capital Intensity 0.056 *** 0.06 *** 0.063 *** 0.074 *** 0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.085 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
Log capital abundance 0.068 *** 0.073 *** 0.043 *** 0.042 *** 0.068 *** 0.068 *** 0.07 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
   x Capital intensity 0.01 *** 0.011 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.006 0.01 *** -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Skill Intensity 0.324 *** 0.315 *** 0.325 *** 0.372 *** 0.084 0.198 *** 0.188 ***
(0.067) (0.084) (0.063) (0.073) (0.077) (0.070) (0.071)
Log human capital abundance -0.033 -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.037 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
   x Skill intensity -1.142 *** -0.968 *** -0.804 *** -0.718 *** -0.982 *** -1.141 *** -0.818 ***
(0.174) (0.192) (0.158) (0.182) (0.168) (0.174) (0.201)
HQ Intensity 0.016 0.061 -0.078 -0.049 -0.16 * 0.011 0
(0.071) (0.076) (0.109) (0.125) (0.093) (0.072) (0.071)
Log population -0.059 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.075 *** -0.089 *** -0.059 *** -0.068 ***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023)
FDI protection 0.039 *** 0.038 *** 0.031 *** 0.029 *** 0.041 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Trade protection -0.023 *** -0.02 *** -0.037 *** -0.037 *** -0.027 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R&D Intensity 1.230 ***
(0.245)
Nunn measure 0.143 *** 0.185 ***
(0.044) (0.044)
   x Governance -0.141 ***
(0.021)
Lambda 0.150 *** 0.164 *** 0.093 *** 0.085 *** 0.112 *** 0.144 *** 0.150 ***
Sample
Observations 180774 163005 131424 115546 112337 179790 179790
Note: Column (1) replicates the baseline results from column (4) in Table 5.   In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the
sample mean from each variable entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as the effect
at the sample mean. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient estimates.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
FullFull
Exclude
foreign-
intensive
industries
Exclude final
goods
Exclude both
foreign-
intensive and
final goods
Industries
with R&D
data
Full
Table 6: Determinants of Intra-Firm Imports - Robustness, HS10-Country 1997
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Figure 1: Intra-rm Import Share and Total Imports in 2000, NAICS Industry 325992
Figure 2: Intra-Firm Import Share and Total Imports in 2000, NAICS Industry 316219
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